TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES HEREIN:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Defendants Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and the State of California (collectively, Defendants) will move this Court *ex parte* for an order (1) to stay the deadlines for filing Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (FAC) until such time as all defendants named in the FAC have been served; and (2) setting a status conference for the purpose of directing a unified briefing schedule for the anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC by the defendants named in the FAC, including Defendants herein, and to relieve Defendants of their obligation under Local Rule 7-3, if any, to meet and confer with each of the Plaintiffs in advance of filing any motions with this Court.

The grounds for this *ex parte* application are as follows:

- 1. There is insufficient time for a regularly noticed motion seeking the relief herein prior to the filing deadline for Defendants' anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike Plaintiffs' FAC. Because Defendants Brown and the State of California were served with the FAC on September 9, 2016, their deadline to file their motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is September 30, 2016. Under Local Rule 7-3, the deadline for these Defendants to meet and confer with each of the 26 Plaintiffs in this case, all of whom are proceeding *pro se*, may be as early September 23, 2016, assuming that Defendants are, in fact, required to meet and confer with all 26 Plaintiffs.
- 2. Plaintiffs commenced this action, proceeding *pro se*, with the filing of their Complaint on July 15, 2016. Complaint, ECF No. 1.
- 3. On July 21, 2016, this Court entered its Minute Order directing that Plaintiff Travis Middleton, who is not a licensed attorney, may not appear on behalf of another person or class of persons, and that accordingly, each of the 26 Plaintiffs represents only himself or herself in this case. Minute Order, ECF No. 7.

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- 4. Defendants were not served with the Complaint. Instead, on August 10, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC), in which they have represented that they continue to proceed *pro se*. FAC, ECF No. 15.
- 5. Defendants Brown and the State of California were served with the FAC by Plaintiff Middleton on September 9, 2016. Other defendants named in the FAC were served by Plaintiff Middleton on September 9, 12, 15, 16 and 21, 2016. Still other defendants, including the spouses of many of the defendants named as legislators in the FAC, have apparently not been served as of the filing of this *ex parte* application.
- Defendants intend to respond to the FAC with motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including, without limitation, on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant the State of California are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Brown are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the *Noerr*-*Pennington* immunity doctrine, and the doctrine of qualified immunity; the enactment of Senate Bill 277 does not violate any recognized rights of the Plaintiffs because the U.S. Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court and various other federal and state courts have repeatedly and uniformly held that mandatory vaccination statutes are within the legitimate and compelling interests of the states to protect the public from the spread of dangerous communicable diseases; and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for a violation of the federal RICO statute or any other alleged conspiracy or other alleged unlawful conduct by and among the Defendants. Defendants understand that the other defendants who have been served with the FAC intend to file motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC on similar grounds, as well as on other grounds unique to them.
- 7. Because Defendants have been served with the FAC on various separate dates, and other defendants have not yet been served, it is in the interests of justice and judicial economy for the Court to stay the deadlines for Defendants' responses

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to the FAC pending the setting of a common date for Defendants' anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC, a unified briefing schedule for such motions, and a common hearing date for these motions.

- 8. Moreover, because all of the 26 Plaintiffs are proceeding *pro se*, it is impossible for Defendants to meaningfully meet and confer with each of the Plaintiffs pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, if, indeed, Defendants are required to meet and confer with each of the 26 Plaintiffs in advance of filing their motions to dismiss and/or strike, or any other motion in this case. Further, of the 26 Plaintiffs, only one (Plaintiff Middleton) has provided a phone number or email at which he can be contacted.
- 9. Defendants believe that it is in the interests of judicial economy and all parties that the Court set a status conference for the purpose of setting a common date for Defendants' responses to the FAC, a unified briefing schedule for the anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike, and other procedural orders, including, without limitation an order relieving Defendants of their meet and confer obligations, if any, under Local Rule 7-3.
- 10. Without the relief requested herein, the anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC by Defendants Brown and the State of California will be due as early as September 30, 2016, and these Defendants may be required to meet and confer with each of the 26 Plaintiffs as early as September 23, 2016 under Local Rule 7-3, which is impossible given that 25 of the Plaintiffs can only be reached through the U.S. Mail.
- 11. Defendants understand and believe that other defendants in this case who have been served will be represented by the Office of Legislative Counsel, which concurs with the relief requested herein.
- 12. Because there are 26 separate Plaintiffs proceeding *pro se*, and due to exigency of the relief sought in this *ex parte* application, Defendants have been unable to meet and confer with Plaintiffs pursuant to Local Rules 7-3 and 7-19.

1	This Notice of Ex Parte Application and Ex Parte Application is based on this	
2	Notice, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the documents	
3	on file with the Court, such other reco	ords and documents of which the Court may be
4	requested to take judicial notice, and	any oral argument to the extent the Court
5	deems such argument necessary.	
6	Dated: September 22, 2016	Respectfully submitted,
7		KAMALA D. HARRIS
8		Attorney General of California RICHARD T. WALDOW ELIZABETH S. ANGRES
9		Supervising Deputy Attorneys General
10		ELIZABETH G. O'DONNELL JACQUELYN Y. YOUNG
11		Deputy Attorneys General
12		
13		/s/ Jonathan E. Rich JONATHAN E. RICH
14		Deputy Attorney General
15		Attorneys for Defendants Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and the State
16		of California
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that, "[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b). Rule 6(b) commits to the district court's discretion the decision to enlarge the time in which a party must respond to a complaint. *See, e.g., Jenkins v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.*, 95 F.3d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1996).

Additionally, "federal courts are vested with inherent powers enabling them to manage their cases and courtrooms effectively." *Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States*, 376 F.3d 960, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, good cause exists for the Court to enlarge the time within which Defendants are to respond to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (FAC) and to set a status conference for the purpose of establishing a uniform briefing schedule and hearing date for Defendants' anticipated motion to dismiss and/or strike the FAC, as well as relieving Defendants of their obligation, if any, to meet and confer with the 26 individual Plaintiffs prior to filing any motions in this case.

Plaintiffs commenced this action, proceeding *pro se*, with the filing of their Complaint on July 15, 2016. Complaint, ECF No. 1.

On July 21, 2016, this Court entered its Minute Order directing that Plaintiff Travis Middleton, who is not a licensed attorney, may not appear on behalf of another person or class of persons, and that accordingly, each of the 26 Plaintiffs represents only himself or herself in this case. Minute Order, ECF No. 7.

Defendants were not served with the Complaint. Instead, on August 10, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC) in which they have represented that they continue to proceed *pro se*. FAC, ECF No. 15.

Defendants Brown and the State of California were served with the FAC on September 9, 2016. Declaration of Jonathan E. Rich (Rich Decl.), ¶ 2. Other

defendants named in the FAC were served on September 9, 12, 15, 16, 20 and 21, 2016. *Id.* Still other defendants, including the spouses of many of the defendants named as legislators in the FAC, have apparently not been served as of the filing of this *ex parte* application. *Id.*

Defendants intend to respond to the FAC with motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including, without limitation, on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant the State of California are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Brown are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the *Noerr-Pennington* immunity doctrine, and the doctrine of qualified immunity; the enactment of Senate Bill 277 does not violate any recognized rights of the Plaintiffs because the U.S. Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court and various other federal and state courts have repeatedly and uniformly held that mandatory vaccination statutes are within the legitimate and compelling interests of the states to protect the public health from the spread of dangerous communicable diseases; and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for a violation of the federal RICO statute or any other alleged conspiracy or other alleged unlawful conduct by and among the Defendants. Rich Decl., ¶ 3.1

The legitimate and compelling state interest in protecting the public health through mandatory vaccinations, especially for school children, has remained unquestioned, and is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence since the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in *Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (*Jacobson*). Courts have repeatedly upheld mandatory student vaccination laws over challenges predicated on the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, education rights, parental rights, and privacy rights, frequently citing *Jacobson. See. e.g., Zucht v. King*, 260 U.S. 174, 175-177 (1922) ("it is within the police power of a state to provide for compulsory vaccination"); *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (a parent "cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death."); *Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton*, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) ("[f]or their own good and that of their classmates, public school children are routinely required to submit to various physical examinations, and to be vaccinated against various diseases"); *Phillips v. City of New York*, 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2nd Cir. 2015) (holding that "mandatory vaccination as a condition for admission to (continued...)

Defendants understand that the other defendants who have been served with the FAC intend to file motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC on similar grounds, as well as on other grounds unique to them. Rich Decl., ¶ 3.

Because Defendants have been served with the FAC on various separate dates, and other defendants have not yet been served, it is in the interests of justice and judicial economy for the Court to stay the deadlines for Defendants' responses to the FAC pending the setting of a common date for Defendants' anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC, a unified briefing schedule for such motions, and a common hearing date for these motions. Rich Decl., ¶ 4.

Moreover, because all of the 26 Plaintiffs are proceeding *pro se*, it is impossible for Defendants to meaningfully meet and confer with each of the Plaintiffs pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, if, indeed, Defendants are required to meet and confer with each of the 26 Plaintiffs in advance of filing their motions to dismiss and/or strike, or any other motion in this case. Rich Decl., ¶ 5. Further, of the 26 Plaintiffs, only one (Plaintiff Middleton) has provided a phone number or email at which he can be contacted. *Id*.

Defendants believe that it is in the interests of judicial economy and all parties that the Court set a status conference for the purpose of setting a common

(...continued)

school does not violate the Free Exercise Clause"); Workman v. Mingo County Sch., 667 F. Supp.2d 679, 690-691 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) ("a requirement that a child must be vaccinated and immunized before it can attend the local public schools violates neither due process nor . . . the equal protection clause of the Constitution"), affirmed Workman v. Mingo County Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App'x 348, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp.2d 938, 956 (E.D. Ark. 2002) ("the question presented by the facts of this case is whether the special protection of the Due Process Clause includes a parent's right to refuse to have her child immunized before attending public or private school where immunization is a precondition to attending school. The Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices answer with a resounding 'no.""). These precedents were recently applied by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California to deny the motion for preliminary injunction filed by another group of plaintiffs challenging SB 277, in the matter entitled Whitlow, et al. v. Department of Education et al., S.D. Cal. Case No. 3:16-cv-01715-DMS-BGS (Whitlow), after which the plaintiffs in that case dismissed their claims. See Rich Decl., Exh. 1.

date for Defendants' responses to the FAC, a unified briefing schedule for the anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike, and other procedural orders, including, without limitation an order relieving Defendants of their meet and confer obligations, if any, under Local Rule 7-3. Rich Decl., ¶ 6.

Without the relief requested herein, the anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC by Defendants Brown and the State of California will be due as early as September 30, 2016, and these Defendants may be required to meet and confer with each of the 26 Plaintiffs as early as September 23, 2016 under Local Rule 7-3, which is impossible given that 25 of the Plaintiffs can only be reached through the U.S. Mail. Rich Decl., ¶ 7.

Defendants understand and believe that other defendants in this case who have been served will be represented by the Office of Legislative Counsel, which concurs with the relief requested herein. Rich Decl., ¶ 8.

Because there are 26 separate Plaintiffs proceeding *pro se*, and due to exigency of the relief sought in this *ex parte* application, Defendants have been unable to meet and confer with Plaintiffs pursuant to Local Rules 7-3 and 7-19.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant their *Ex Parte* Application for an order (1) to stay the deadlines for filing Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' FAC until such time as all defendants named in the FAC have been served; and (2) setting a status conference for the purpose of directing a unified briefing schedule for the anticipated motions to dismiss the FAC by the defendants named in the FAC, including Defendants herein, and to relieve Defendants of their obligation under Local Rule 7-3, if any, to meet and confer with each of the Plaintiffs in advance of filing any motions with this Court.

1	Dated: September 22, 2016	Respectfully submitted,
2		KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California
3		Attorney General of California RICHARD T. WALDOW ELIZABETH S. ANGRES
4		Supervising Deputy Attorneys General
5		ELIZABETH G. O'DONNELL JACQUELYN Y. YOUNG Deputy Attorneys General
6		Deputy Attorneys General
7		
8 9		/s/ Jonathan E. Rich JONATHAN E. RICH Deputy Attorney General
10		Attorneys for Defendants Governor
11		Attorneys for Defendants Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and the State of California
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DECLARATION OF JONATHAN E. RICH

2 I, Jonathan E. Rich, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of California and am admitted to practice before this Court. I am a Deputy Attorney General with the Office of the Attorney General, counsel for Defendants Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and the State of California in this case. As such, I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein:
- 2. Defendants Brown and the State of California were served with the FAC on September 9, 2016. I am informed by Cara L. Jenkins, Deputy Legislative Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel, that the defendants named in the FAC who are state legislators, and two defendants identified as spouses of legislators, were served on September 9, 12, 15, 16 and 21, 2016. Other defendants, including the spouses of many of the defendants named as legislators in the FAC, have apparently not been served as of the filing of this *ex parte* application.
- 3. Defendants intend to respond to the FAC with motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including, without limitation, on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant the State of California are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Brown are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the *Noerr-Pennington* immunity doctrine, and the doctrine of qualified immunity; the enactment of Senate Bill 277 does not violate any recognized rights of the Plaintiffs because the U.S. Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court and various other federal and state courts have repeatedly and uniformly held that mandatory vaccination statutes are within the legitimate and compelling interests of the states to protect the public health from the spread of dangerous communicable diseases; and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for a violation of the federal RICO statute or any other alleged conspiracy or other alleged unlawful conduct by and among the Defendants. I understand through conversations with Ms. Jenkins

that other defendants who have been served with the FAC intend to file motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC on similar grounds, as well as on other grounds unique to them.

- 4. Because Defendants have been served with the FAC on various separate dates, and other defendants have not yet been served, it is in the interests of justice and judicial economy for the Court to stay the deadlines for Defendants' responses to the FAC pending the setting of a common date for Defendants' anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC, a unified briefing schedule for such motions, and a common hearing date for these motions.
- 5. Because all of the 26 Plaintiffs are proceeding *pro se*, it is impossible for Defendants to meaningfully meet and confer with each of the Plaintiffs pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, if, indeed, Defendants are required to meet and confer with each of the 26 Plaintiffs in advance of filing their motions to dismiss and/or strike, or any other motion in this case. Further, of the 26 Plaintiffs, only one (Plaintiff Middleton) has provided a phone number or email at which he can be contacted.
- 6. Defendants believe that it is in the interests of judicial economy and all parties that the Court set a status conference for the purpose of setting a common date for Defendants' responses to the FAC, a unified briefing schedule for the anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike, and other procedural orders, including, without limitation an order relieving Defendants of their meet and confer obligations, if any, under Local Rule 7-3.
- 7. Without the relief requested herein, the anticipated motions to dismiss and/or strike the FAC by Defendants Brown and the State of California will be due as early as September 30, 2016, and these Defendants may be required to meet and confer with each of the 26 Plaintiffs as early as September 23, 2016 under Local Rule 7-3, which is impossible given that 25 of the Plaintiffs can only be reached through the U.S. Mail.

8. I understand from Ms. Jenkins that the state legislators and their spouses who have been served will be represented by the Office of Legislative Counsel, which concurs with the relief requested herein. Because there are 26 separate Plaintiffs proceeding pro se, and due to exigency of the relief sought in this ex parte application, Defendants have been unable to meet and confer with Plaintiffs pursuant to Local Rules 7-3 and 7-19. 10. Attached hereto and made a part hereof is a true and correct copy of the Order dated August 25, 2016, denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in that certain matter entitled Whitlow, et al. v. Department of Education et al., S.D. Cal. Case No. 3:16-cv-01715-DMS-BGS (Whitlow), after which the plaintiffs in that case dismissed their claims. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed in Los Angeles, California on the below date. Dated: September 22, 2016 /s/ Jonathan E. Rich JONATHAN E. RICH, Declarant

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE					
2						
3	Case Name: Middleton, et al. v. Pan et No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR					
5	I hereby certify that on <u>September 22, 2016</u> , I electronically filed the following documents with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:					
6 7	DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER (1) TO					
8	STAY THE DEADLINES FOR DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO					
9	PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND (2) SETTING A					
10	STATUS CONFERENCE; DECLARATION OF DEPUTY ATTORNEY					
11	GENERAL JONATHAN E. RICH					
12	Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by					
13	e CM/ECF system.					
14	I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered					
15	CM/ECF users. On September 22, 2012, I caused to be delivered the foregoing					
16	document(s) by overnight courier FedEx to the following non-CM/ECF					
17	participants:					
18	SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST.					
19	declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the					
20	foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on <u>September</u>					
21	22, 2016, at Los Angeles, California.					
22	Jonathan E. Rich /s/ Jonathan E. Rich					
23	Declarant Signature					
24						
25						
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28						

SERVICE LIST 1 2 Travis Middleton Eric Durak 27 West Anapamu Street, No. 153 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 133 Campo Vista Drive 3 Santa Barbara, CA 93111 4 Jade Baxter Julianna Pearce 5 28780 My Way 207 West Victoria Street Santa Barbara, CA 93101 6 Oneals, CA 93645 7 Candyce Estave Denise Michelle Derusha 430 East Rose Avenue 7125 Santa Ysabel, Apt. 1 8 Santa Maria, CA 93454 Atascadero, CA 93422 9 Melissa Christou Andrea Lewis 10 1522 Knoll Circle Drive 1331 Santa Barbara Street, No. 10 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 11 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 12 Rachil Vincent Jackie Kozak 4320 Viua Presada 1573 Lyndhvist Avenue 13 Santa Barbara, CA 93110 Camarillo, CA 93010 14 Don Demanlevesde Jessica Haas 15 618 West Ortega 2715 Verde Vista Santa Barbara, CA 93111 16 Santa Barbara, CA 93105 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1 2 3	Page 2 Paige Murphy 2230 Memory Lane West Lake Village, CA 91361	Christie Macias 618 West Ortega Santa Barbara, CA 93101
456	Lori Strantz 120 Barranca No. B Santa Barbara, CA 93109	Anwanur Gielow 390 Park Street Buelton, CA 93427
7 8	Lisa Ostendorf 5459 Place Court Santa Barbara, CA 93111	JuliaAnne Whitney 55 Chrestview Lane Montecito, CA 93108
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) 1 2	Cara L. Jenkins Deputy Legislative Counsel Office of Legislative Counsel Via email by agreement of counsel: cara.jenkins@legislativecounsel.ca.gov	
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